General Disarray

Every sixties bleeding-heart liberal should have military in the family – it keeps you from getting stupid about things. And there was that conversation with the lieutenant colonel, shortly before he assumed battalion command – cool ceremony, by the way – about General Stanley McChrystal. We were both kind of amazed that Obama had put McChrystal in charge of things in Afghanistan – Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A). That’s a mouthful, but why him? We were both puzzled. But on June 10, 2009, the Senate approved McChrystal to take command in Afghanistan, so he did.

McChrystal’s career had been as a Special Forces guy – get in, get the bad guys, and get out before anyone knows what happened – the stuff no one talks about, or is denied. And of course those of us with long memories remember how McChrystal was implicated in the cover-up of Pat Tillman’s death by friendly fire – he seemed to be at the center of things. McChrystal was put in charge of the paperwork to award Tillman a posthumous Silver Star for valor, but McChrystal was one of eight officers recommended for discipline by a subsequent Pentagon investigation. They all knew the whole things was a battlefield screw-up. The Army declined to take action against McChrystal – no point in keeping that controversy alive. And in Iraq, McChrystal’s unit, Task Force 6-26, had some issues with its interrogation methods, at Camp Nama, where it was accused of abusing detainees, sort of torturing them – and some died before anyone figured out they knew nothing and were nobody in particular. After Abu Ghraib, when that sort of thing became an issue, thirty-four members of that task force were disciplined – McChrystal wasn’t. But he isn’t exactly a sweetheart.

The lieutenant colonel was there – of course in the first war over Kuwait and then several tours in the second effort (and heading back now) – and he had dealt with McChrystal. The usual thing – dead civilians who shouldn’t be dead and the short order from McChrystal – clean it up, fix it – and McChrystal walked away. Of course that never happened. What the lieutenant colonel said was off the record, over a beer on a hot afternoon at Fort Bliss. Maybe the lieutenant colonel made it up. You decide.

But McChrystal had a reputation – beginning in late spring 2007 his teams launched a new series of covert operations that coincided with the famous Surge of 2007 – killing or capturing many of the key al-Qaida leaders in Iraq. In a CBS 60 Minutes interview Bob Woodward described this new special operations capability – joint teams of CIA and Army Special Forces. It was a new way of doing things. Several senior officials said that these joint efforts by what were essentially paramilitary units were the most significant contributor to the defeat of al-Qaida in Iraq – the guy was good, brutal and secretive, but good.

And then Petraeus converted him into a counterinsurgency guy – win the hearts and mind of the locals, keep the peace and get them to love their own government, and build a working society, and also drive the bad guys away and eliminate their key leaders.

That was a stretch – but that is the job in Afghanistan. And McChrystal agreed, but had his issues with the task:

McChrystal submitted a 66 page report to Defense Secretary Robert Gates calling for more troops in Afghanistan, saying “We are going to win,” which became public on September 20, 2009. McChrystal warned that the war in Afghanistan may be lost if more troops are not sent, but the report ends on a note of cautious optimism: “While the situation is serious, success is still achievable.” McChrystal’s release to the public of his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense was decried by critics as an “unprecedented” move by a general to force the hand of the president, and some in Congress have called on the president to fire McChrystal for making the report public. Congressman Dennis Kucinich stated the view that generals are “subordinate to the president who is the commander-in-chief. He’s the boss. And when generals start trying to suggest publicly what the president should do, they shouldn’t be generals anymore.”

But McChrystal had his own “strategic assessment team” – Fred Kagan, and Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, Anthony Cordesman and Andrew Exum – all the neoconservatives of the old Cheney-PNAC crowd, who knew that the new president was dead wrong. The thought was that the general should articulate what the new policy should be, and the American people, who trust the military, would see that in matters of policy, the president should do what the generals say, as any good subordinate should. Bush had always been saying he listened to what his generals in the field said – his hands were tied and he had to do what they thought was best. McChrystal’s buddies thought they could ride that pony a bit further.

That didn’t work out. Many thought McChrystal should be fired for insubordination for disclosing information that he should have said only in private to the president – and McChrystal, under pressure from Secretary of Defense Gates, backed down and apologized. For a complete discussion of that business, see what everyone was saying in October 2009. It wasn’t pretty.

And as CNN reports (with video) here we go again:

The fate of the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan hinges on his meeting Wednesday with President Barack Obama, who was “angry” after reading the general’s remarks about colleagues in a magazine profile to be published Friday.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal will likely resign, a Pentagon source who has ongoing contacts with the general said.

The “magnitude and graveness” of McChrystal’s mistake in conducting the interview for the article were “profound,” White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said McChrystal had “made a significant mistake and exercised poor judgment.”

McChrystal apologized Tuesday for the profile, in which he and his staff appear to mock top civilian officials, including the vice president. Two defense officials said the general fired a press aide over the article, set to appear in Friday’s edition of Rolling Stone.

Yep, read the Rolling Stone article – and note that the rank and file has lost faith in McChrystal’s new-found counterinsurgency strategy and believe it places them at a greater risk:

But however strategic they may be, McChrystal’s new marching orders have caused an intense backlash among his own troops. Being told to hold their fire, soldiers complain, puts them in greater danger. “Bottom line?” says a former Special Forces operator who has spent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.”

But that’s not the main point. The man was having a bad day, as CNN chronicles:

“I extend my sincerest apology for this profile. It was a mistake reflecting poor judgment and should never have happened,” McChrystal said in a Pentagon statement. “Throughout my career, I have lived by the principles of personal honor and professional integrity. What is reflected in this article falls far short of that standard.”

McChrystal has been recalled to Washington to explain his actions to the president. He is expected to meet with Obama in the Oval Office on Wednesday, Gibbs said. Gibbs refused to speculate about McChrystal’s fate, but told reporters “all options are on the table.”

So what the hell happened? What happened was that McChrystal let his staff let loose on what the general really thought of things:

In the profile, writer Michael Hastings writes that McChrystal and his staff had imagined ways of dismissing Vice President Joe Biden with a one-liner as they prepared for a question-and-answer session in Paris, France, in April. The general had grown tired of questions about Biden since earlier dismissing a counterterrorism strategy the vice president had offered.

“‘Are you asking about Vice President Biden,’ McChrystal says with a laugh. ‘Who’s that?'”

“‘Biden?’ suggests a top adviser. ‘Did you say: Bite Me?'”

And calling Obama’s national security advisor a clown stuck in 1985 was not cool. That, and letting the world know, through this article, that the general thinks his commander-in-chief is a dork:

McChrystal does not directly criticize Obama in the article, but Hastings writes that the general and Obama “failed to connect” from the outset. Sources familiar with the meeting said McChrystal thought Obama looked “uncomfortable and intimidated” by the room full of top military officials, according to the article.

Later, McChrystal’s first one-on-one meeting with Obama “was a 10-minute photo op,” Hastings writes, quoting an adviser to McChrystal. “Obama clearly didn’t know anything about him, who he was. Here’s the guy who’s going to run his f—ing war, but he didn’t seem very engaged. The Boss (McChrystal) was disappointed.”

McChrystal did not get the respect he thought he deserved – everyone knows who he is. And he’s not forgiven Obama, or anyone associated with Obama:

The article goes on to paint McChrystal as a man who “has managed to piss off almost everyone with a stake in the conflict,” including U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, special representative to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke and national security adviser Jim Jones. Obama is not named as one of McChrystal’s “team of rivals.”

Of Eikenberry, who railed against McChrystal’s strategy in Afghanistan in a cable leaked to The New York Times in January, the general is quoted as saying, “‘Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books. Now if we fail, they can say, “I told you so.'”

Hastings writes in the profile that McChrystal has a “special skepticism” for Holbrooke, the official in charge of reintegrating Taliban members into Afghan society and the administration’s point man for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“At one point on his trip to Paris, McChrystal checks his BlackBerry, according to the article. ‘Oh, not another e-mail from Holbrooke,’ he groans. ‘I don’t even want to open it.’ He clicks on the message and reads the salutation out loud, then stuffs the BlackBerry back in his pocket, not bothering to conceal his annoyance. “‘Make sure you don’t get any of that on your leg,’ an aide jokes, referring to the e-mail.”

And on it goes, with the reactions you would expect. CNN covers the outraged member of Congress – even Republicans. But Hamid Karzai weighed in – telling Obama to keep McChrystal as the commander in Afghanistan. The government in Kabul believes McChrystal is a man “of strong integrity who has a strong understanding of the Afghan people and their culture” – but that could be the kiss of death. Karzai’s government is part of the problem, as we have to tell the locals it’s really way cool, even if anyone can see it’s hopelessly corrupt and profoundly useless.

But maybe it was all just harmless joking around – no big deal – but maybe not, according to Rolling Stone executive editor Eric Bates:

The comments made by McChrystal and other top military aides during the interview were “not off-the-cuff remarks,” he said. They “knew what they were doing when they granted the access.” The story shows “a deep division” and “war within the administration” over strategy in Afghanistan, he contended.

McChrystal and his staff “became aware” that the Rolling Stone article would be controversial before it was published, Hastings told CNN Tuesday.

Maybe that was what they intended? So the Wednesday meeting is one of those it’s-you-or-me moments. One of those two guys will walk out of the Oval Office as president.

Or maybe it’s nothing. See Kori Schake in Foreign Policy:

McChrystal’s comments are not particularly wide of the norm – this is what war-fighters sound like when they’re talking to each other. It’s not polite, and it certainly isn’t politically correct, but these are people doing deadly work. They develop cynical attitudes about civilians and our often impractical ideas. They do not feel understood, much less appreciated, by the political wheelers and dealers in Washington, and politically-motivated attacks on McChrystal will aggravate that. Let us not forget George Orwell’s caution that “we sleep safe in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm.” This is what rough men sound like, and we shouldn’t want to wring that toughness out of them. They will not long remain a war-winning army if we do.

That seems a minority view. Andrew Exum runs through the alternatives:

In the end, your opinion on whether or not Gen. McChrystal should be dismissed might come down to whether or not you think the current strategy is the correct one for the war in Afghanistan. My own prediction is that Gen. McChrystal will be retained. As much as critics of counterinsurgency like to blame Gen. McChrystal (and nefarious think-tankers, of course) for the current strategy, the reality is that the civilian decision-makers in the Obama Administration conducted two high-level reviews in 2009 and twice arrived at a national strategy focused on conducting counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. I suspect the president will not replace the man he has put in charge of executing that strategy with just 12 months to go before we begin a withdrawal.

Time’s Joe Klein says this:

A few months ago, (McChrystal) received an email from a soldier fighting in Kandahar Province. The soldier was frustrated–as most of his comrades are–with the very restrictive rules of engagement that the General had laid down to prevent civilian casualties. Rather than ignore the email or have the trooper reprimanded, McChrystal went to Kandahar and walked a patrol with the soldier’s squad. Afterwards, he had a meal with the squad and explained the necessity for the new rules.

Jeffrey Goldberg riffs on that:

Joe says McChrystal is an extraordinary man, and a great fighter, but he comes to the sad conclusion that McChrystal has to go, in part because he resolutely fails to understand the media environment in which he operates, but in larger part because he has been disrespectful to the commander-in-chief. I have to agree, particularly with the second half. I remember once in Iraq being made to feel profoundly uncomfortable by an Army colonel who was openly scornful of President Bush’s tactical leadership of the war effort (this was well-before the surge). I didn’t disagree with his analysis one bit, but I thought it was deeply inappropriate and even nervous-making, to hear a senior military leader disparaging his commander. Civilian control of the military is a paramount American virtue, and anyone who undermines this core principle is unfit to serve. There’s no way around this fundamental fact, unfortunately.

And Tom Ricks says McChrystal will be gone in a week or two:

My nomination is for Petraeus to step down an echelon and take the Afghanistan command. You could leave him nominally the Centcom chief but let his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. John Allen, oversee Iraq, the war planning for Iran, and dealing with Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. But more likely is that Petraeus will ask for another Marine general, James Mattis, who is just finishing up at Jiffycom, and who had planned to retire later this year and head home to Walla Walla, Washington. Petraeus and Mattis long have admired each other. The irony is that Mattis has a reputation – unfairly, I think – for speaking a little too bluntly in public about things like killing people. I think Mattis is a terrific, thoughtful leader.

We’ll see. And see Andrew Sullivan:

It’s a shock, isn’t it? Obama essentially gave McChrystal everything he asked for, and backed the full counter-insurgency strategy. He has, in my view, foolishly thrown more resources and more ambition at this hopeless task than his predecessor ever did. And yet, McChrystal and his flunkies still feel the need to bad-mouth and mock those who lost the argument. This is news, no? It’s important news. It reflects on the character and integrity of the man tasked to lead America’s longest ever war.

It seems Spencer Ackerman made the same point:

The amazing thing about it is there are no complaints from McChrystal or his staff about the administration on any substantive ground. After all, McChrystal and his allies won the argument within the White House. All the criticisms – of Eikenberry, of Jones, of Holbrooke, of Biden – are actually just immature and arrogant snipes at how annoying Team America (what, apparently, McChrystal’s crew calls itself) finds them. This is not mission-first, to say the least.

In fact, you have to go deep in the piece to find soldiers and officers offering actual critiques. And what they offer is criticism of McChrystal for being insufficiently brutal. Every one of them quoted here is a mini-Ralph Peters, upset because McChrystal won’t let them “get our fucking gun on,” as one puts it.

And there’s conservative Byron York:

I just got off the phone with a retired military man, with more than 25 years experience, who has worked with Gen. Stanley McChrystal in the Pentagon. His reaction to McChrystal’s performance in the new Rolling Stone profile? No surprise at all.

“Those of us who knew him would unanimously tell you that this was just a matter of time,” the man says. “He talks this way all the time. I’m surprised it took this long for it to rear its ugly head.”

And there’s the even more conservative Ed Morrissey:

So far, McChrystal hasn’t earned enough leash by winning anything. Regardless of what one thinks of the current C-in-C, Obama is still the man elected by the people to run the executive branch and the military. The picture this article paints is one of a lack of discipline and respect, and the White House has every right to demand an apology and replace McChrystal with someone who understands better the subtleties of overall command and its politics.

And there’s Marcy Wheeler getting to the heart of the matter:

The article is far more subtle than the tizzy lets on. And the tizzy ignores the real moral of the story, revealed after five pages of eye-popping revelations. McChrystal’s counter-insurgency plan is failing. It’s failing not because some of his aides said mean things about Biden, and not because he’s got a long-running spat with Karl Eikenberry, our Ambassador to Afghanistan. It’s failing because the Special Ops guys, whom McChrystal led killing bunches of people in Iraq, are not hard-wired to win hearts and minds.

And Andrew Sullivan is all over that:

The trouble with appointing Stanley McChrystal to run the Af-Pak war was always his temperament and his history. He is a driven man, strong-headed, amazingly disciplined, extremely able in a limited fashion – and clearly unused to compromise or getting along with people as powerful as he is. Diplomat he is not. As head of JSOC, moreover, he has always regarded himself as above political management, running a part of the military that seems at times to answer to no one, and that, under Bush and Cheney was unleashed to do whatever it wanted, including, of course, brutal torture in the field, condoned from the very top.

These qualities might have seemed appealing at first for Afghanistan. Here you had a former torturer/badass – who had learned by brutal experience that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cannot be won that way. Converted to counter-insurgency as a philosophy, he was an apostate from the Bush-Cheney approach of “kill, bomb and torture until they embrace human rights” school.

Alas, you can’t take an entire philosophy of warfare and reverse it easily, especially when your own men were among the most brutal and badass of the bunch.

So you find comments like that one from one of McChrystal’s men:

“Bottom line?” says a former Special Forces operator who has spent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts. His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger. Every real soldier will tell you the same thing.”

Sullivan:

“Every real soldier.” You see: there are real Americans and fake Americans; and there are real soldiers and fake ones. Let’s just put it this way about the legacy of McChrystal’s JSOC: you cannot imagine a soldier who had worked for Petraeus for a long time saying such a thing.

Alas, as is also ironically the case, there is no way counter-insurgency can work in the tenth year of occupation, without commitment to another thirty years, instead of eighteen months. And there is no way it can work without a viable and trusted central government. But Obama did not have the intellectual or political guts to walk away, and was trapped by early campaign announcements in favor of the “good war” in Afghanistan. It may well have been the good war in 2002; but that didn’t make it a winnable war in 2009.

And so everyone without a personal or ideological or partisan stake in this knows the war McChrystal claimed he alone could win is doomed.

And as for mocking Biden and his light-footprint counterterrorism idea, not massive troop build-ups and fully staffed counterinsurgency heart-and-minds stuff, Sullivan says this:

It doesn’t take a genius to see this contempt as rooted in the growing recognition among many and the growing fear among the McChrystal clique that Biden has been right all along, that the McChrystal strategy was a product of hope over experience, and that the arrogance that drove it was part of what had long been wrong with the conduct of both tragically flawed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. …

What this reveals to me is the incoherence of the Obama position on Afghanistan. We cannot win by 2011. And we will never win unless we devote far more resources and many more decades to neo-imperial control than America can afford and more than the American and British publics will tolerate. Maybe deploying McChrystal to do his best – and still fail – will be the only way of proving this – which is why this incident is actually, to my mind, a good thing.

It may help bring this madness to an earlier end.

Need to ask the lieutenant colonel about that – but he’s in transit – Benning to Kuwait to Baghdad. It’ll wait. And McChrystal will be long gone by then, or not.